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COMMENTS
WHAT—IF ANYTHING—IS AN
E-MAIL?  APPLYING ALASKA’S
CIVIL DISCOVERY RULES TO
E-MAIL PRODUCTION
JONATHAN B. EALY*
AARON M. SCHUTT**
This Comment examines the possible application of
Alaska’s Rules of Civil Discovery to the production of e-
mail.  This Comment discusses the characteristics of e-mail
in comparison with other kinds of documents.  Relevant
Alaska law shows how the Alaska Supreme Court likely
will treat e-mail as a discoverable form of communication
under Alaska Rules of Civil Discovery 26 and 34.  The
Comment continues by defining and describing the burdens
of discovery associated with e-mail and explaining how e-
mail also raises issues of privilege regarding the preserva-
tion of that privilege.  Finally, the Comment recommends
several steps that Alaska courts should take to resolve the
application of the state’s rules of discovery to e-mail.
I.  INTRODUCTION
In 1980, biologist Debra K. Bennett published a scientific pa-
per with a surprising conclusion: after examining the common
physical structures of a group of animals and applying the strict
rules used in classifying organisms, she concluded that the entire
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group of animals did not, in fact, exist.1  In response, biologist Ste-
phen Jay Gould wrote an article with the interesting title “What, If
Anything, Is a Zebra?”2
In litigation, we now face a similar question.  We all know how
the rules of civil procedure apply to the production of documents
and other tangible items.  What we do not know, however, is this:
for the purposes of the rules of civil procedure, what, if anything, is
an e-mail?
The question is not as frivolous as it first sounds.  Courts
across the country are wrestling with rules and procedures for e-
mail production.  Commentators have written numerous articles on
the topic.3  The final outcome of this debate will have important
ramifications on the course of litigation for years to come.
In the meantime, attorneys are left with a great degree of un-
certainty as to how they should advise their clients to handle e-
mail.  A minor industry has emerged for consultants who recom-
mend elaborate internal e-mail policies for corporations.4  Compa-
nies wary of major production efforts often choose technology
based in part on facility of recall and restoration, introducing a
level of inefficiency over and above the direct costs of litigation.5
With nobody quite sure what the standards will be, attorneys and
clients are forced to be overly cautious in preserving electronic in-
formation.  Even still, there is no way to assure that some impor-
tant information will not be lost.
As the use of e-mail expands at home and in the workplace,
understanding and controlling the potential impact of e-mail dis-
covery will be essential for order and efficiency in the discovery
process.  Parties on both sides of litigation would benefit greatly
1. Debra K. Bennett, Stripes Do Not a Zebra Make, Part I: A Cladistic
Analysis of Equus, 29 SYSTEMATIC ZOOLOGY 272 (1980).
2. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, What, if Anything, is a Zebra?, in HEN’S TEETH &
HORSE’S TOES: FURTHER REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 355 (1983).  The
scientists were debating whether the different types of zebras formed their own
family or whether they were merely horses or asses with stripes.  It was the group
that might not exist, not the animal.  Id.
3. See, e.g., infra notes 11, 12, 36, 79, 86.
4. See, e.g., Sheila J. Carpenter & Shaunda A. Patterson, Discovery of Elec-
tronic Documents, THE BRIEF, Summer 2000, at 68-70 (outlining the necessary
elements of corporate e-mail policies).
5. See, e.g., Christopher V. Cotton, Document Retention Programs for Elec-
tronic Records: Applying a Reasonableness Standard to the Electronic Era, 24 J.
CORP. L. 417, 419 (1999) (noting that corporate document retention programs in-
volve “balancing of potentially competing interests” that include “(1) legal obliga-
tions, (2) efficiency considerations, and (3) pre-litigation concerns” (footnotes
omitted).
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from more guidance from the courts on these important discovery
issues.
In this comment, we will analyze the state of the law relating
to e-mail production in Alaska and other jurisdictions and will
make simple proposals for handling a few of the more important
aspects.
II.  SHOULD E-MAIL BE TREATED LIKE OTHER DOCUMENTS?
The Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure allow for the production
of “documents” during discovery.6 Interpretation of the identical
Federal Rule by Federal courts leaves little doubt that e-mail is dis-
coverable.7  Under current Rule 34 and its limited category of
“documents,” e-mail can fall in only one category: “data compila-
tions from which information can be obtained, translated, if neces-
sary, by the respondent through detection devices into reasonably
usable form.”8  The limited nature of the categories of documents
in Rule 34 has led several courts to treat the production of e-mail
as if it were identical to the production of hard-copy documents
stored in a file drawer.9  This, however, ignores several important
differences between e-mail and traditional documents.
6. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 34 governs the production of documents in
civil discovery.  It provides:
(a) Scope.  Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to pro-
duce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on the
requestor’s behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents (in-
cluding writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phonorecords,
and other data compilations from which information can be obtained,
translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into
reasonably usable form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tan-
gible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule
26(b) and which are in the possession, custody or control of the party
upon whom the request is served.
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 34(a).
7. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8272
RPP JCF, 2002 WL 63190, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202
F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.D.C. 2001) (“During discovery, the producing party has an obli-
gation to search available electronic systems for the information demanded.”);
Simon Property Group, L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind.
2000).
8. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 34(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
9. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C
897, MDL 997, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995);
Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986)
(“[I]nformation which is stored, used, or transmitted in new forms should be
available through discovery with the same openness as traditional forms.”).
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First, e-mail is far more voluminous than paper documenta-
tion.  By the year 2005, North Americans will send approximately
eighteen billion e-mail messages per day.10  The sheer volume of in-
formation transferred by e-mail can make collecting and producing
those “documents” a difficult task.
Second, e-mail is informal.  People routinely say things in e-
mails that they would never write in hard-copy memoranda or cor-
respondence.11  Due to the ease and speed of communication, the
style of e-mails is much more like that of a conversation than a
drafted document.
Third, e-mails contain more information.  The electronic
version of an e-mail may contain much more information than a
hard copy.  For example, the electronic version contains informa-
tion created automatically by e-mail software, about which neither
the drafter nor the reader may ever know.  The e-mail program
may store information about when certain files were created, who
has worked on them, what changes were made, and who has ac-
cessed the e-mail.12  Furthermore, some employers may set up pro-
grams to monitor their employees’ use of e-mail that can record
other types of information.
Fourth, e-mail may be stored in multiple locations.  A sin-
gle e-mail sent from one person to multiple parties may end up
stored in the company’s server or servers, each employee’s individ-
ual computer hard drive, backup systems, system-wide archives or
in hard-copy form if anyone prints the e-mail.13
Fifth, e-mail can be forwarded.  Employees often reply to e-
mail messages by attaching the original message in the reply.  Em-
ployees also frequently forward the original message to persons
who were not on the original distribution list.  Thus, a copy of a
single message sent to one person may end up attached in several
different message strings and distributed to multiple parties with-
out the knowledge of its sender.  Maintaining the confidentiality of
10. See By the Numbers, INFOWORLD, Sept. 25, 2000, at 22.
11. See Heidi L. McNeil & Robert M. Kort, Discovery of E-mail: Electronic
Mail & Other Computer Information Shouldn’t be Overlooked, 56 OR. ST. B.
BULL., Dec. 1995, at 21-22; Alex Salkever, Hot on the E-trail of Evidence at Enron,
Business Week, at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2002/nf2002
0129_3701.htm (Jan. 29, 2002).
12. See James K. Lehman, Tips for Discovery of Electronic Information, 8
PRAC. LITIGATOR, Nov. 1997, at 9-10; Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin,
Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41
B.C. L. REV. 327, 337-38 (2000).
13. See Salkever, supra note 11.
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work product and attorney-client materials sent in e-mails has be-
come an important issue.
Finally, e-mail is kept in multiple formats.  E-mail is rou-
tinely stored on system servers, individual hard drives, backup
drives, backup tapes and archive tapes.14  In each location, the e-
mail can potentially be stored in a different format.  Furthermore,
e-mail can be encrypted for security reasons.  Searching and col-
lecting e-mail from these various sources can be a significant tech-
nological challenge.
So, what, if anything, is an e-mail?  In content and volume, e-
mail is more like conversation than correspondence, although it
can take either form.  From a technological standpoint, e-mail is a
blend of human- and computer-generated information likely to be
stored in multiple locations and formats.  Given these differences,
e-mail is far from identical to other types of tangible “documents”
that are traditionally the subject of production during civil litiga-
tion.15  Some of the unique issues that arise during e-mail produc-
tion and ideas that may help facilitate e-mail production need to be
considered now.
III.  ALASKA LAW TO DATE
The Alaska Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the
issue of e-mail in the context of discovery.  In the absence of
Alaska case law, two factors are important to note in predicting the
decision of Alaska courts on the issue.  First, the Alaska Supreme
Court has consistently interpreted the Civil Rules regarding dis-
covery broadly so as to favor discoverability and has stated that
“Alaska’s discovery rules should be given a liberal interpretation in
14. See, e.g., Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ.
8272 RPP JCF, 2002 WL 63190, at *1-4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002) (describing stor-
age formats of archived and backed-up e-mails for several defendant companies).
15. McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2001)
Using traditional search methods to locate paper records in a digital
world presents unique problems.  In a traditional “paper” case, the pro-
ducing party searches where she thinks appropriate for the documents
requested under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34.  She is aided by the
fact that files are traditionally organized by subject or chronology . . . ,
such as all the files of a particular person, independent of subject.
Backup tapes are by their nature indiscriminate.  They capture all infor-
mation at a given time and from a given server but do not catalogue it by
subject matter.
Id.
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order to effectuate the underlying purpose of those rules.”16  Sec-
ond, in the absence of Alaska case law, the court has stated that
federal court decisions interpreting identical Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are “especially persuasive.”17
Although the Alaska Supreme Court has not addressed the
discoverability of e-mail, it has referred to e-mail messages in five
recent decisions.18  The court’s references to e-mail indicate that the
court considers e-mail both a form of communication and a docu-
ment or record.
A. E-mails as Documents
In Helmuth v. University of Alaska Fairbanks,19 the supreme
court reviewed an administrative hearing process regarding an em-
ployee’s discharge for insubordination.20  The court held that an
administrative record, composed largely of e-mail messages, was
sufficient to sustain a hearing officer’s finding of insubordination
by an employee: “The numerous electronic mail messages between
May and August 1992 evidence instances of impertinence, guile,
and unwillingness to conform to [the supervisor’s] directives . . . .
Throughout this period, [the employee’s] conduct warranted chas-
tisement by [the supervisor] via electronic mail . . . . The record
amply supports a finding of insubordination.”21  The court’s treat-
ment of e-mail in Helmuth shows that as early as 1995, it consid-
ered e-mail a communication sufficient to convey an employee’s
16. Van Alen v. Anchorage Ski Club, Inc., 536 P.2d 784, 787 (Alaska 1975);
see Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 461 (Alaska 1986) (“We
recognize that the discovery rules are to be broadly construed and that relevance
for purposes of discovery is broader than for purposes of trial.”).
17. Nolan v. Sea Airmotive, Inc., 627 P.2d 1035, 1041 (Alaska 1981) (discuss-
ing ALASKA R. CIV. P. 23); see Nome Commercial Co. v. Nat’l Bank of Alaska,
948 P.2d 443, 450 n.6 (Alaska 1997) (discussing ALASKA R. CIV. P. 22); Langfeldt-
Haaland v. Saupe Enters., Inc., 768 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Alaska 1989) (Moore, J., dis-
senting) (discussing ALASKA R. CIV. P. 35); Johnston v. All State Roofing & Pav-
ing Co., 557 P.2d 770, 772-73 n.7 (Alaska 1976) (discussing ALASKA R. CIV. P. 22).
18. Gwich’in Steering Comm. v. State, Office of the Governor, 10 P.3d 572,
581, 582 (Alaska 2000); Copper River Sch. Dist. v. Traw, 9 P.3d 280, 282, 288, 289
(Alaska 2000); Nickerson v. Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, 975 P.2d 46, 48, 51, 54
(Alaska 1999); Helmuth v. Univ. of Alaska Fairbanks, 908 P.2d 1017, 1018, 1019,
1021 n.10, 1023 (Alaska 1995); Paul Wholesale v. State, 908 P.2d 994, 1006 (Alaska
1995).
19. 908 P.2d 1017 (Alaska 1995).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1023.
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intent to disregard a supervisor’s commands.22  The court also
treated e-mail as a document or record—in this case, a contempo-
raneous record of the insubordination sufficient to uphold the ad-
ministrative hearing officer’s findings of fact.23  The court’s later
references to e-mail are consistent with this approach.
In Gwich’in Steering Committee v. State, Office of the Gover-
nor,24 the court considered whether e-mails between the Gover-
nor’s Deputy Chief of Staff and the Director of State/Federal Rela-
tions fell within the deliberative process privilege exception to
Alaska’s Public Records Act.25  Analyzing the e-mails in the same
manner as several other categories of documents, including memo-
randa26 and a draft media plan,27 the court concluded that the e-
mails were protected by the deliberative process privilege.28
B. E-mails as Communications
In Paul Wholesale v. State,29 the court concluded that an e-mail
message “in conjunction with other circumstances” produced the
appearance of impropriety in a state contract solicitation, justifying
the State’s cancellation of the solicitation.30  In Copper River School
District v. Traw, 31 the two-justice dissent argued that an e-mail, in
conjunction with two oral conversations, was a communication suf-
ficient to rescind a contract offer made by the School District.32  In
Nickerson v. University of Alaska Anchorage, 33 the court relied on
an e-mail in the context of other communications in its review of
whether the University of Alaska’s dismissal of a student from his
practicum comported with due process and the University’s proce-
dural requirements.34
In sum, the Alaska Supreme Court has treated e-mail as a
form of communication and as a document or record.  This treat-
ment, in conjunction with the court’s precedent for liberally inter-
22. See id. at 1018-19 (“[The supervisor] and [the employee] communicated
more frequently by electronic mail than in person.”).
23. See id. at 1023.
24. 10 P.3d 572 (Alaska 2000).
25. Id. at 580-84.
26. See id. at 581-82.
27. See id. at 582.
28. Id. at 583.
29. 908 P.2d 994 (Alaska 1995).
30. Id. at 1002.
31. 9 P.3d 280 (Alaska 2000).
32. Id. at 288 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting).
33. 975 P.2d 46 (Alaska 1999).
34. Id. at 51, 54.
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preting the Alaska Civil Rules in favor of discovery, suggests the
court would likely find e-mail discoverable under Civil Rules 26
and 34.
IV.  THE BURDENS OF E-MAIL DISCOVERY
A relatively large body of case law35 and authority36 has dis-
cussed burdens associated with the discovery of e-mail and other
electronic data.  This discussion is understandable given several
cases in which the costs associated with production of archived and
backup e-mails has reached $1 million.37  The potentially extraordi-
nary costs of responding to discovery requests are only one of the
burdens of e-mail discovery.  Many other burdens, some of which
have been explicitly recognized by courts considering the matter,
exist today.38  Potential amendments to the Alaska Civil Rules and
an emerging trend toward cost-shifting could remedy some of these
problems.
35. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1052-54 (S.D.
Cal. 1999); In re General Instrument Corp. Securities Litigation, No. 96 C 1129,
1999 WL 1072507, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Has-
bro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120 (LMM) (AJP), 1996 WL 22976 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23,
1996).
36. See, e.g., Timothy Q. Delaney, E-mail Discovery: The Duties, Danger and
Expense, FED. LAWYER, Jan. 1999, at 42, 46; Richard L. Marcus, Complex Litiga-
tion at the Millennium: Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Elec-
tronic Material, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 270-71 (2001); Scheindlin &
Rabkin, supra note 12, at 356-61; Marnie H. Pulver, Note, Electronic Media Dis-
covery: The Economic Benefit of Pay-Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1379
(2000).
37. Janet Novack, Control/Alt/Discover, FORBES MAG., Jan. 13, 1997, at 60
(describing court order requiring corporate litigant to produce 50,000 backup
storage tapes at an estimated cost of over $1 million); see Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v.
William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8272 RPP JCF, 2002 WL 63190, at *2-4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002) (listing estimated costs to produce archived e-mail with
costs to individual defendants ranging from $247,000 to $403,000); United States v.
Visa USA, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7076 (BSJ), 1999 WL 476437, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 7,
1999) (noting Visa’s cost to produce archived e-mail at $130,000); In re Brand
Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (or-
dering defendant to retrieve backed-up data at estimated cost of $50,000 to
$70,000); Linnen v. A.H. Robbins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *4 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. June 16, 1999) (noting cost to restore defendant’s archived e-mails was
estimated at between $850,000 and $1.4 million).
38. See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting that the
government would have “to insist that its employees do the restoration [of backup
tapes] lest confidential information be seen by someone not employed by the gov-
ernment who has no right to see it”).
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A.  Defining the Burdens
The first step in addressing the potential burdens associated
with e-mail discovery is identifying those burdens.  Such an inquiry
should not be limited to the million-dollar newspaper headline
cases.
One burden of e-mail discovery is the time, effort and cost of
drafting corporate e-mail policies and document retention policies
regarding e-mail.  This issue springs directly from the imprecise fit
of e-mail into the discovery rules.  Much has been written about the
need for corporate e-mail policies to safeguard against high pro-
duction costs and the potential for spoliation in later unforeseen
litigation.39  However, the direct correlation between the uncer-
tainty in the application of the discovery rules to e-mail and the
risk-averse tendency of attorneys to safeguard excessively against
that uncertainty has received less attention.
Another burden is the time required to respond to discovery
requests for e-mail.  As noted above, the sheer volume of e-mail in
corporate America makes review of that e-mail in the context of
discovery potentially overwhelming.  The court in Rowe Enter-
tainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.,40 for example, noted
that one party had estimated that it would take two and one-half
years to fully respond to a request to produce archived e-mails.41
The court in In re General Instrument Corp. Securities Litigation42
also recognized that the burden on the defendant associated with
the technical aspect of retrieving archived material would be “just
the start of the process” and that “[d]efense counsel would then
have to read each e-mail, assess whether the e-mail was responsive,
and then determine whether the e-mail contained privileged infor-
mation.”43
Another burden involves intrusion into the computer records
of the responding party necessary to accomplish discovery.  The
potential intrusiveness of e-mail discovery may exceed an accept-
able level.44  Among other forms of embedded information, e-mails
39. See, e.g., Randolph A. Kahn & Kristi L. Vaiden, If the Slate is Wiped
Clean: Spoliation: What It Can Mean for Your Case, BUS. L. TODAY, June 1999, at
13; Delaney, supra note 36, at 42.
40. No. 98 Civ. 8272 RPP JCF, 2002 WL 63190, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002).
41. Id. at *4.
42. No. 96 C 1129, 1999 WL 1072507, at *5-*6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999).
43. Id. at *6.
44. See Marcus, supra note 36, at 270.  Professor Marcus notes: “[P]erhaps the
intrusiveness now possible is of a different magnitude, and calls for revising the
basic idea that protecting privacy should be the exception, not the rule, where dis-
covery is concerned,” and that: “[e]xcept for a few privileged matters, nothing is
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may contain histories of revisions of the e-mail; the times e-mail
was sent and received, and by whom; whether the e-mail was actu-
ally opened, thereby indicating a greater likelihood the e-mail was
actually read; and the specific computer from which the e-mail was
sent.  This amount of information about a particular document
stands in stark contrast to the black and white of ink on paper,
which contains no more and no less than is visible to the eye.
These embedded forms of information in e-mail may reveal too
much information about individuals’ personal and professional ac-
tivities that may or may not be discoverable under the current rules
of discovery.  Regardless, as more of our world becomes digitized,
the burdens associated with the level of intrusiveness in civil dis-
covery will increase dramatically and the issue of intrusiveness
should not be ignored.45
Finally, the financial burdens of discovery responses on indi-
viduals and small businesses can be significant.  A potential cost of
as much as several thousand dollars for searching computer hard
drives or backup tapes for deleted and archived e-mails would be
relatively more burdensome for individuals or small businesses
than a similar request to a multi-national corporation.  Further, the
interruption of a small business in order to accomplish discovery of
that business’s e-mail can be significant.  These concerns have not
gone unnoticed by the courts.  One of the few published cases al-
lowing discovery of a computer hard drive for “deleted” informa-
tion involved a large corporation’s discovery request to an individ-
ual’s small business.46  The court minimized the impact on the
individual by requiring the corporation to “pay the costs associated
with the information recovery, . . . accommodate Defendant’s
schedule as much as possible,” and minimize the down time of the
individual’s computer.47
sacred in civil litigation.”  Id. (quoting Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca Cola Co.,
107 F.R.D. 288, 290 (D. Del. 1985)); see also Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 669 So.2d
1142, 1145 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that plaintiff’s request to inspect defendant
medical doctor’s computer system would involve “patients’ confidential rec-
ords . . . and all of the records of defendant’s entire business, including those not
involved in the instant action.”).
45. See Rowe Entm’t, 2002 WL 63190, at *7 (rejecting privacy argument em-
ployer raised on behalf of employees: “[A]n employee who uses his or her em-
ployer’s computer for personal communications assumes some risk that they will
be accessed by the employer or by others.”).
46. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
47. Id. at 1054.
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B. Alaska Civil Rule 26(b)(2)’s Limitation of Burdensome
Discovery
Federal courts are becoming increasingly aware of the poten-
tially extraordinary burdens that discovery of e-mails and other
electronic data can place on litigants.  In response, several recent
decisions have limited otherwise valid discovery requests where the
burdens of the discovery exceeded the benefits.48
The basis for limiting burdensome requests is Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(2).  Alaska’s identical counterpart estab-
lishes limits to discovery and provides in relevant part:
The court may alter the limits in these rules . . . .  The frequency
or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise permitted
under these rules shall be limited by the court if it determines
that: . . . the burden or expense of the proposed discovery out-
weighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case,
the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance
of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.  The court may
act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to
a motion under paragraph (c).49
Moreover, a policy of minimizing the costs of litigation underlies
the Alaska Civil Rules.  Rule 1 provides that “[the] rules shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.”50
In the context of e-mail discovery, some federal courts have
seized upon the language in Rule 26(b)(2) and ruled that parties
need not produce archived or deleted materials.51  In response, the
48. See the cases discussed in footnotes 35 & 37.
49. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (emphasis added).  The advisory committee
notes to the 1983 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 explain the
purpose of the limitations.  As to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(iii), the
notes state:
The elements of Rule 26(b)(1)(iii) [now (b)(2)(iii)] address the problem
of discovery that is disproportionate to the individual lawsuit as meas-
ured by such matters as its nature and complexity, the importance of the
issues at stake in a case seeking damages, the limitations on a financially
weak litigant to withstand extensive opposition to a discovery program
or to respond to discovery requests, and the significance of the substan-
tive issues, as measured in philosophic, social, or institutional terms.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to the 1983 amendments.
50. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 1.
51. In re General Instrument Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 96 C 1129, 1999 WL
1072507, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999) (quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(2)); cf. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (citing weighing of benefits versus
burden of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) in granting
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Advisory Committee in 2000 amended Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b)(1) by adding one sentence to the end of the Rule: “(1)
In General.  Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party . . . .  All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by
Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).”52  The Advisory Committee Notes
explain the addition of the last sentence:
[A] sentence has been added calling attention to the limita-
tions of subdivision (b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).  These limitations
apply to discovery that is otherwise within the scope of subdivi-
sion (b)(1).  The Committee has been told repeatedly that courts
have not implemented these limitations with the vigor that was
contemplated.  This otherwise redundant cross-reference has
been added to emphasize the need for active judicial use of sub-
division (b)(2) to control excessive discovery.53
Some federal courts have also cited Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) in
crafting discovery limitations related to e-mail and electronic data
discovery.  In General Instrument, the court denied the plaintiffs’
motion to compel discovery of archived e-mails and other elec-
tronic data from backup tapes.54  The court found three reasons for
holding that the burden or expense of the proposed discovery out-
weighed its likely benefit.  First, the defendant had “already pro-
plaintiff’s request to access defendant’s computer hard drive); Simon Prop. Group,
L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 642 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (“In short, the court
believes plaintiff is entitled to look for this material [deleted e-mails], but in terms
of the factors relevant under Rule 26(b)(2)(iii), the court is not convinced that the
subject of this very expensive discovery lies at the very heart of the case.”); but see
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997,
1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (“[I]f a party chooses an electronic
storage method, the necessity for a retrieval program or method is an ordinary
and foreseeable risk.”).  In Brand Name, the court ruled that the defendant should
bear the $50,000 to $70,000 cost of creating a retrieval program for archived e-
mails and fulfilling the production requests.  Id. at *2-3.
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
53. Id. advisory committee notes to the 2000 amendments (citations omitted).
The case of Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998), cited in the committee
notes, involved an inmate’s suit against a correctional officer under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (2000).  Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 579-80.  One question the Court addressed
was what discretion a district court has to ensure “that officials are not subjected
to unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings” when the defen-
dant has a qualified immunity defense.  Id. at 597-98.  The Court stated that “Rule
26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to
dictate the sequence of discovery.”  Id. at 598.  Quoting the discovery limitations
present in Rule 26(b)(2), the Court concluded that the provisions of Rule 26 “cre-
ate many options for the district judge.”  Id. at 599.
54. 1999 WL 1072507, at *6.
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duced more than 110,000 pages of documents” making it “unlikely
that additional documents [were] necessary.”55  Second, the plain-
tiffs failed to identify “any specific factual issue for which addi-
tional discovery would help them prove their case.”56  Third, the
plaintiffs had previously indicated “that discovery had been con-
cluded.”57  The court recognized that the expense burden on the de-
fendant associated with the technical aspect of retrieving archived
material only “start[ed] the process,” and that “[d]efense counsel
would then have to read each e-mail, assess whether the e-mail was
responsive, and then determine whether the e-mail contained
privileged information.”58
In Alexander v. Federal Bureau of Investigation,59 the court
also refused to require the Executive Office of the President to
“completely restore all deleted files and e-mail.”60  Citing the costs
and time involved in an exhaustive search of archived e-mails and
backup tapes, the court limited discovery to “targeted and appro-
priately worded searches of back-up and archived e-mail and de-
leted hard drives for a limited number of individuals.”61
In sum, some federal courts seem to be increasingly hesitant to
require parties to fulfill broad ranging discovery requests for ar-
chived and/or deleted electronic data, including e-mails, when the
burdens of discovery outweigh the benefits.
C.  Shifting Costs of Burdensome Discovery
The general rule of civil discovery is that the responding party
pays the costs of production incurred in responding to discovery
requests.  As noted above, in the context of e-mail and other elec-
tronic discovery, those costs can be substantial.  However, Alaska’s
Civil Rules provide means for shifting unusually burdensome costs
from a producing party to a requesting party.62
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 188 F.R.D. 111 (D.D.C. 1998).
60. Id. at 117.
61. Id.
62. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) & (c).  The Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion, interpreting the identical Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, notes:
Taken together, these provisions give the court broad authority to control
the cost of discovery.  They permit the court to impose not only limits but
also conditions.  The court can implement the cost/benefit rationale of
the rule by conditioning particular discovery on the payment of its costs
by the party seeking it.
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Until recently, the federal courts seemed to be unsympathetic
to responding parties’ cries of undue burden and generally required
parties to bear the costs of searching their electronic backups for
relevant archived and/or deleted e-mails.63  Currently, however, the
question of who should bear the costs of production seems to de-
pend more on the context of the situation.64  This seems due in part
to a growing concern that electronic discovery can, without appro-
priate limitations, impose extraordinary burdens on parties as well
as the courts.65  This contextual analysis played out in Resource In-
vestment, Inc. v. United States.66  There, Judge Turner denied the
plaintiff’s motion to require the government to produce, at its own
cost, backup tapes potentially containing relevant e-mail of the
Army Corps of Engineers:
It strikes me that the principle of diminishing returns has
some application here.  It would appear that all the veins have
been mined that are going to reveal information at a reasonable
cost and we’re down to the point of considering how much is it
worth to go through these other tapes.  That makes me wonder if
DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.433, at 81
(3d ed. 2001).  The Manual makes specific reference to the applicability of cost-
shifting in its section discussing discovery of computerized data.  Id. § 21.446, at 87
& n.187.
63. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig, Nos. 94 C 897,
MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995); Delaney, supra note
36, at 44 (“Federal district courts have not been sympathetic to parties’ arguments
of undue expense and burden when faced with requests for relevant e-mail.”).
64. See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2001) (requiring
defendant-employer to perform backup restoration of e-mails attributable to
computer of plaintiff-employee’s supervisor for one-year period following date of
letter to supervisor complaining of retaliation and threatening to file an adminis-
trative claim); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120 (LMM)
(AJP), 1996 WL 22976, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996) (requiring requesting party
to pay costs of programming required to fulfill discovery request for computerized
data); Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL 360526, at *2-3 (requiring pro-
ducing party to produce its responsive, computer-stored e-mail at its own expense
and requiring requesting party to narrow the scope of its request and pay twenty-
one cents per page for copying); Tr. of Oral Argument, Resource Investments,
Inc. v. United States, No. 98-419L, at 40 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 9, 1999) (on file with
authors).
65. See McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34 (“If the likelihood of finding something was
the only criterion, there is a risk that someone will have to spend hundreds of
thousands of dollars to produce a single e-mail.”); see generally Corinne L. Gia-
cobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding Who
Should Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 257 (2000).
66. No. 98-419L (Fed. Cl. Nov. 9, 1999).
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it shouldn’t be the party that thinks it is worth doing that pays
for it in this circumstance.67
The decision in Resource Investment is typical of a growing number
of court decisions that base cost allocation in the context of e-mail
discovery on the likelihood that relevant information will be found.
The court in McPeek v. Ashcroft68 also reached this conclusion.
There, an employee sued the Department of Justice (“DOJ”),
claiming that he was retaliated against because he accused a super-
visor of sexual harassment.69  A discovery dispute arose after DOJ
searched its electronic records in response to McPeek’s discovery
requests but refused to perform a search of backup and archived
electronic records.70  McPeek sought the backed-up and archived
data, claiming that it might contain files “ultimately deleted by the
user but . . . stored on the backup tape.”71  The DOJ “protest[ed]
that the remote possibility that such a search will yield relevant
evidence cannot possibly justify the costs involved.”72
The court began by rejecting the notion that a party is obli-
gated by the Civil Rules to restore and search archived backup
tapes in every case.
There is certainly no controlling authority for the proposition
that restoring all backup tapes is necessary in every case.  The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require such a search,
and the handful of cases are idiosyncratic and provide little
guidance.  The one judicial rationale that has emerged is that
producing backup tapes is a cost of doing business in the com-
puter age.  In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL
360526, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).  But, that assumes an al-
ternative.  It is impossible to walk ten feet into the office of a
private business or government agency without seeing a network
computer, which is on a server, which, in turn, is being backed
up on tape (or some other media) on a daily, weekly or monthly
basis.  What alternative is there?  Quill pens?73
The court also rejected the notion that a requesting party
should always pay the costs of production of backup tapes based on
a market economic approach, positing that such a rule would
“guarantee that the requesting party would only demand what it
needs”:
67. Tr. of Oral Argument Re Disc. Mot., Resource Investment, Inc. v. United
States, No. 98-419L at 40 (Fed. Cl., Nov. 9, 1999) (on file with authors).
68. 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
69. Id. at 31-32.
70. Id. at 32.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 33 (footnote omitted).
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[A] strict cost-based approach ignores the fact that a government
agency is not a profit-producing entity and it cannot be said that
paying costs in this case would yield the same “profit” that other
foregone economic activity would yield . . . . Second, if it is rea-
sonably certain that the backup tapes contain information that is
relevant to a claim or defense, shifting all costs to the requesting
party means that the requesting party will have to pay for the
agency to search the backup tapes even though the requesting
party would not have to pay for such a search of a “paper” de-
pository.74
Instead, the Court returned to the trend of shifting costs based on
the likelihood of success of the search:
A fairer approach borrows, by analogy, from the economic prin-
ciple of “marginal utility.”  The more likely it is that the backup
tape contains information that is relevant to a claim or defense,
the fairer it is that the government agency search at its own ex-
pense.  The less likely it is, the more unjust it would be to make
the agency search at its own expense.  The difference is “at the
margin.”75
Finally, in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency,
Inc.,76 the court adopted a balancing approach considering a num-
ber of factors to decide which party should bear the financial bur-
den of production of archived and backed-up e-mail, including:
(1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of
discovering critical information; (3) the availability of such in-
formation from other sources; (4) the purposes for which the re-
sponding party maintains the requested data; (5) the relative
benefit to the parties of obtaining the information; (6) the total
cost associated with production; (7) the relative ability of each
party to control costs and its incentive to do so; and (8) the re-
sources available to each party.77
In Rowe, the court decided that the plaintiffs’ extremely broad dis-
covery requests, the marginal expected success rate of the search,
the defendant’s lack of a business use for its archived backup tapes,
the absence of any prospective benefit to the defendant of produc-
tion, the extraordinary total costs of production, and the plaintiffs’
ability to limit the costs of production made cost-shifting to the re-
questing plaintiff appropriate.78
74. Id. at 34.
75. Id.
76. No. 98 Civ. 8272 RPP JCF, 2002 WL 63190 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002).
77. Id. at *8.
78. Id. at *8-11.  The court found that the “availability of other sources” factor
favored defendant’s bearing the costs of production and that “the parties’ re-
sources” factor was a neutral factor.  Id. at *9, *11.
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Although the logic of allocating costs for discovery searches of
archived e-mail based on the likelihood that the backup tapes con-
tain relevant evidence is sound, the process presents several prob-
lems.  First, such a cost allocation scheme, by its nature, could po-
tentially require extensive judicial supervision over the discovery
process.  Therefore, while solving the problem of the fair allocation
of costs, the solution exacerbates an existing problem—judicial
backlog.  Second, the fair outcome described in McPeek assumes
one critical fact: that the trial court has a strong familiarity with the
particular case and can accurately assess the likelihood that backup
tapes will contain relevant evidence.  The assumption that a par-
ticular judge will have the requisite familiarity with a case may play
out in some, or many cases, but it will certainly not be true in oth-
ers.  As one commentator has pointed out, discovery disputes often
arise early in litigation and at a time when judicial familiarity with
the case is understandably low.79
The issues raised by e-mail discovery have led to calls for, and
discussions of, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to provide for cost-shifting.80  Recently, Texas amended its
Rules of Civil Procedure to specifically account for concerns about
the burdens of discovery associated with e-mail and electronic data.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.4 provides:
To obtain discovery of data or information that exists in elec-
tronic or magnetic form, the requesting party must specifically
request production of electronic or magnetic data and specify the
form in which the requesting party wants it produced.  The re-
sponding party must produce the electronic or magnetic data
that is responsive to the request and is reasonably available to
the responding party in its ordinary course of business.  If the re-
sponding party cannot—through reasonable efforts—retrieve
the data or information requested or produce it in the form re-
quested, the responding party must state an objection complying
with these rules.  If the court orders the responding party to
comply with the request, the court must also order that the re-
questing party pay the reasonable expenses of any extraordinary
steps required to retrieve and produce the information.
This comment does not suggest that Alaska should follow
Texas’s lead and adopt a cost-shifting rule.  That being said,
Alaska, as the only state with a mandatory attorney fee-shifting
79. See John L. Carroll, Discovery Disputes & Electronic Media, ALI-ABA
Course of Study, Civil Practice and Litigation Techniques in the Federal and State
Courts, ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, August 23-24, 2001.
80. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 374-77; Marcus, supra note 36,
at 274-79.
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structure in its civil rules,81 has shown that fairly allocating the bur-
dens of civil litigation is an important policy underlying its civil
rules.82  Alaska courts, then, should be cognizant of their inherent
power under Alaska Civil Rule 26 to limit unduly burdensome dis-
covery requests or shift costs from the responding to the requesting
party.83
V.  ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ISSUES
E-mail discovery raises important attorney-client privilege is-
sues in two ways.84  First, in order to preserve the privilege, a re-
sponding party has the obligation to review each document before
producing it to the requesting party.  In the case of e-mail, the re-
sponding party’s attorney currently must review each e-mail for
privileged information before producing it.  Thus, when there are
three million e-mails potentially responsive to a discovery request,
the responding party’s attorney must expend considerable effort
reviewing each e-mail individually in order to ensure that none
contains privileged matter.85  This issue falls seamlessly back into
81. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82.  Rule 82(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by law or agreed to by the parties, the prevailing party in a civil case
shall be awarded attorney’s fees calculated under this rule.”  Id.; see also ALASKA
R. CIV. P. 79 (“Unless the court otherwise directs, the prevailing party is entitled
to recover [allowable] costs.”).
82. See Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 587 (Alaska 1973); Preferred
General Agency of Alaska, Inc. v. Raffetto, 391 P.2d 951, 954 (Alaska 1964) (“The
purpose of Civil Rule 82 in providing for the allowance of attorney’s fees is to par-
tially compensate a prevailing party for the costs to which he has been put in the
litigation in which he was involved.”).
83. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
84. See Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Cassano, 189 F.R.D. 83, 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Aramony v. United Way of Am., 969 F. Supp. 226, 235 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); see generally Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 368-69.
85. Counsel, of course, have the obligation to perform this review in order to
fulfill obligations to clients under the ethical rules governing attorneys.  ALASKA
R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.3 (Diligence), 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information).  Rule
1.6(a) specifically provides:
A lawyer shall not reveal a confidence or secret relating to representa-
tion of a client unless the client consents after consultation . . . .  For pur-
poses of this rule, “confidence” means information protected by the at-
torney-client privilege under applicable law, and “secret” means other
information gained in the professional relationship if the client has re-
quested it be held confidential or if it is reasonably foreseeable that dis-
closure of the information would be embarrassing or detrimental to the
client.  In determining whether information relating to representation of
a client is protected from disclosure under this rule, the lawyer shall re-
solve any uncertainty about whether such information can be revealed
against revealing the information.
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the aforementioned issue of the burdens associated with applying
current rules to e-mail.86
A. The Problem of Forwarding E-mails
Attorney-client privilege issues arise specifically in the case of
e-mail because of the ease of forwarding or copying e-mails to oth-
ers.  As one commentator has noted:
E-mails within a company may take on a life of their own.  For
example, an e-mail sent to one person can then be forwarded to
several additional persons.  Each person may add to the mes-
sage, thereby creating a lengthy string of communications on a
particular subject.  To the extent attorneys are participants in the
string, the issue of privilege arises.87
The risk exists that within that lengthy string of communications,
one or more participants has changed the subject of the original
message.  By changing the subject, this practice of forwarding or
copying e-mails can have the unintended consequence of waiving
privileges that would otherwise protect the e-mail or its attach-
ments from discovery.
B. E-mailing Expert Witnesses
One particular area where e-mail discovery can have poten-
tially serious litigation consequences involves expert witnesses.
The general rule is that information provided by a party in litiga-
tion to an expert witness must be disclosed, even if it would other-
wise qualify as attorney work product: the work product protection
is “waived by disclosure of confidential communications to expert
witnesses.”88  The results of inadvertent waiver can be disastrous.
In In re Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., Monsanto Com-
pany sued Pioneer for patent infringement and breach of contract
after Pioneer merged with another company.89  Pioneer had con-
ALASKA R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(a) (emphasis added).
86. For an in-depth discussion of the application of the attorney-client privi-
lege to e-mail production, see Colleen L. Rest, Note, Electronic Mail and Confi-
dential Client-Attorney Communications: Risk Management, 48 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 309 (1998); Armen Artinyan, Legal Impediments to Discovery and Destruc-
tion of E-mail, 2 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 95, 100-05 (2000); Delaney, supra
note 36, at 46; Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 368, 379-80.  It is important
to note that under either the current Alaska Rules or Federal Rules, whether it is
possible to minimize the potentially extraordinary costs associated with attorney
review of individual e-mails for privilege remains unresolved.
87. Delaney, supra note 36, at 46.
88. In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
89. Id. at 1372-73.
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sulted with a law firm regarding the financial and tax consequences
of the merger prior to the Monsanto litigation.  During the litiga-
tion, Pioneer provided its expert witness with the law firm’s analy-
ses.90  That action, the Federal Circuit held, waived both attorney-
client and work product protections.  “We are quite unable to per-
ceive what interests would be served by permitting counsel to pro-
vide core work product to a testifying expert and then to deny dis-
covery of such material to the opposing party.”91  The Pioneer court
held that Monsanto was entitled to discovery of the information
through both document production and oral testimony.92
Although Pioneer did not directly address the issue of e-mails,
its broad holding suggests that forwarded or copied e-mail can
waive privileged matters contained in the e-mails.  Given that at-
torneys and their clients frequently communicate by e-mail in
modern business practice, it is conceivable that both attorneys and,
especially, clients could unintentionally waive attorney-client
privilege and work product protections by forwarding or copying
expert witnesses in their communications.  This danger grows in
proportion to the lengthy string of communications in forwarded
and copied e-mails.
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS
The record from other jurisdictions has shown that e-mail pro-
duction can cause significant problems for all of the parties in-
volved.  As Alaska courts begin to address these issues, three sim-
ple ideas may prove to be useful.
First, courts should emphasize the inclusion of the specific
items for e-mail discovery in pre-trial discovery discussions.  This
could be accomplished through an amendment to Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(f).93  During the meeting required by Rule 26(f),
90. Id. at 1373.
91. Id. at 1375.
92. Id. at 1376.
93. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(f) provides in full:
Meeting of Parties; Planning for Discovery and Alternative Dispute
Resolution.  Except when otherwise ordered and except in actions ex-
empted from disclosure under Rule 26(a), the parties shall, as soon as
practicable and in any event at least 14 days before a scheduling confer-
ence is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b), meet to dis-
cuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibili-
ties for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case, including whether
an alternative dispute resolution procedure is appropriate, to make or ar-
range for the disclosures required by subparagraph (a)(1), and to de-
velop a proposed discovery plan and a proposed alternative dispute
resolution plan.  The plan shall indicate the parties’ views and proposals
concerning:
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the parties should be required to reach specific agreements about
the scope and procedures for production of e-mail, including
whether e-mail would be produced in electronic or paper form, the
scope of required searches for archived and backed up e-mails and
the amount of material the parties will be required to maintain in
databases.  A specific agreement between the parties will alleviate
many problems related to unintentional spoliation of evidence and
will significantly cut expenses related to over-broad searching and
the requirement of maintaining enormous databases of saved ma-
terials.
Second, courts should emphasize the burden-sharing aspects
of Rule 26(b)(2).  Allocation of burdens between parties to litiga-
tion is already common in Alaska.  For example, Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure shifts a portion of the cost of litigation onto the
losing party, and Rule 68 allows a party to reduce its risk of con-
tinuing litigation by submitting a reasonable offer of judgment.  If
the courts require costs of extensive or exotic e-mail production to
be borne, in whole or in part, by the parties seeking that produc-
tion, then no rule specifically allocating costs of electronic produc-
tion (as in Texas) will be necessary.
Third, the courts should expand the scope of inadvertent
waiver protection.  Much of the burden of producing e-mail comes
from reviewing the enormous amount of messages in order to pro-
tect against disclosure of privileged, proprietary or embarrassing or
(1) what changes should be made in the timing or form of disclosures
under paragraph (a), including a statement as to when the disclo-
sures under subparagraph (a)(1) were made or will be made and
what are appropriate intervals for supplementation of disclosure
under Rule 26(e)(1);
(2) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery
should be completed, and whether discovery should be conducted in
phases or be limited to or focused upon particular issues;
(3) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery im-
posed under these rules and what other limitations should be im-
posed;
(4) the plan for alternative dispute resolution, including its timing, the
method of selecting a mediator, early neutral evaluator, or arbitra-
tor, or an explanation of why alternative dispute resolution is inap-
propriate;
(5) whether a scheduling conference is unnecessary; and
(6) any other orders that should be entered by the court under para-
graph (c) or under Rule 16(b) and (c).
The attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties that have appeared
in the case are jointly responsible for arranging and being present or rep-
resented at the meeting, for attempting in good faith to agree on the pro-
posed discovery plan, and for submitting to the court within 10 days after
the meeting a written report outlining the plan.
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damaging irrelevant materials.  The parties could save a significant
amount of time and expense if inadvertent waiver rules were
broadened to require the automatic return of any such materials.
If the party receiving the material disagreed with the request for
return, it could, of course, seek relief from the court.94
VII.  CONCLUSION
This Comment has raised the question, what, if anything, is an
e-mail?  In answering this simple question, we have concluded that,
analogous to Dr. Bennett’s conclusion about the zebra, it is difficult
to place e-mail into an existing category for purposes of discovery
under the current Alaska Civil Rules.  Whatever e-mail may be,
though, it is a fact of life—and of civil litigation discovery.
Understanding how to treat discovery of e-mail has been a chal-
lenge for all who have attempted to address it.  The informal style
of discourse, the total amount of information and the new and
changing technology that store the information make it an unique
form of communication.  Each court that has been asked to address
the issue of e-mail discovery has brought its own interpretation and
has added to our understanding.  Alaska has an opportunity to
built on the wisdom of these other courts and to craft a set of rules
that benefit all parties to litigation.
94. This practice is already commonly implemented by agreement between
parties to complex litigation with voluminous document production.  See Rowe
Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8272 RPP JCF, 2002 WL
63190, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002) (proposing this solution for parties involved
in electronic data discovery dispute but noting that court could not require it).
